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The materialist conception of history starts
from the
proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production,
tfce exchange
ot things produced, is the basis of all
social structure; that in every society that has appeared
in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed
and
society divided into classes or orders is dependent
upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how
the products are exchanged.
From this point of view
the final causes of all social changes and political
revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains,
not in man's better insight into external truth and
justice, but in changes in the modes of production
and exchange.
Frederick Engels
Cited in S. Hook, Marx and the Marxists
p.

160.

CHAPTER

I

THEORETICAL FORMULATION

Introduction
Thomas Kuhn (1962) has put forth the notion that the history and development of science can be conceptualized through
an understanding of the emergence and dissolution of para-

digms of scientific thought.

According to Kuhn, the tools,

methods, values, and theories of

prevailing paradigm of the time.

a

science derive from the

Furthermore, he argues that

certain modes of inquiry, or certain content areas, are deemed

legitimate or illegitimate depending upon the governing paradigm.

While Kuhn's thesis has received widespread acceptance
as a useful framework for conceptualizing the history of sci-

ence, his contention that possibly scientific knowledge it-

self is ephemeral

remains a provocative challenge to the

fundamental assumption that it is the scientist's work to uncover actual laws of nature.

This rather blasphemous position has been developed even
more extensively by Berger and Luckmann (1966).

Indeed, they

contend that all of what goes under the name of "reality",
not only science, is constructed, maintained, and transformed
over time through a dialectical social process involving the

individual and society.

While Kuhn recognizes the importance

of the sociology of the scientific community in influencing
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the persistence or abandonment of a paradigm, his analysis

stops short of directly implicating social factors as deter-

minants of changes in paradigms.

Instead, while he sees so-

cial factors as important, his primary attribution in the mo-

dification of

a

paradigm lies in the serrendipitous discovery

of "anomalies", that is, "actual" findings which undermine
the credibility of the existing paradigm.

Whether in science or in the social universe, two notions
emerge from Kuhn and Berger and Luckmann.

First of all, both

works posit the idea that at any given time in history, there
are models, themes, or paradigms upon which scientific and

social reality are founded.
(Kuhn, p.

174)

These "constellations of beliefs"

or "disciplinary matrices"

(Kuhn, p.

182)

de-

termine which areas of inquiry are to receive attention and

which are to be ignored.

In addition, the way attention is

directed, and the very interpretations made, derive from the

underlying assumptions which comprise the paradigm.
Second, both works make attributions regarding transfor-

mations of either paradigm or social reality.

As noted

scientific
above, Kuhn attributes changes in paradigm to real

discovery of anomolies, while Berger and Luckmann attribute
societal
change to an ongoing dialectical relation in which
and the
members continually confirm and transform each other

society through their confirmations.
and Berger
These differences in attribution between Kuhn
Kuhn will
in values.
and Luckmann point only to a difference
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not go so .far as to deny "reality."

Berger and Luckmann, on

the other hand, will not locate the dialectical process they

elucidate in

a

material context.

For purposes of comparison,

it should be noted that a Marxist position would understand

the dialectical relations between underlying social or scien-

tific paradigms, their ob j ectif ication and reification as

"reality", and their continual transformation over time, in
a

context which situates this entire process in an economic

system which reproduces and transforms itself in concert with
the development of capitalism.

could argue that

a

Assuming this position, one

prevailing paradigm, and the socially con-

structed reality that is associated with it, are themselves
to be understood as reflections of an economic moment in his-

tory.

A notable change in paradigm, then, can potentially be
Or, the kind of transfor-

related to economic developments.

mations Berger and Luckmann describe can be viewed as mediated by or located in an advancing capitalist society.
In arriving at this point, we have made a number of as-

sumptions which need clarification.

First, we have assumed

the plausibility of Kuhn's argument that in a science, there

exist belief systems, or disciplinary matrices, or paradigms,

which govern the work in the field and which are transformed
as anomalies present themselves.

sumed Berger and Luckmann'

s

Second, we have further as-

assertion that on a more general

societal level, reality is essentially

a

social construction

process.
emanating from an ongoing, historical interactional

4

Third, if we now assume a Marxist viewpoint, we find that
there is no essential difference between scientific paradigms
and socially constructed realities, in that both are them-

selves situated in and reflections of

a

capitalist economic

system in which all elements of the society serve in the system's reproduction.

One science which is precariously situated at the interface of scientific and social reality is psychology.
fact,

In

it is the job of psychology to "scientifically" con-

struct, measure, and describe social reality.

This task be-

comes even more confounded if we keep in mind the assumption

that scientific constructions are themselves socially and

perhaps economically determined.

From this position, psy -

chology serves to scientifically reify social reality

,

in

that it makes of behavior concretized scientific laws

,

which

are then enacted by individuals.

Given this, were it possible to articulate the "paradigm"
then perhaps
in which psychology currently operates, we could

interprets
specify the dimensions on which it constructs and

people and their behavior.

Rather than accept the findings

to uncover the
of psychology as fact, then, we would attempt
"facts" and
paradigm or disciplinary matrix upon which these

"findings" are founded.

If we could then relate the dimen-

social and economic
sions of that paradigm to the present

5

system,

it.

might become possible to see how the field perpet-

uates and reproduces that structure.

Undoubtably, this is seemingly

a

preposterous task.

First of all, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain an essentially hypothetical set of beliefs which con-

stitute

a

There exists no obvious methodology for

paradigm.

such an endeavor.

Second, any obtainable methodology would

itself be subject to contamination by its own existence within the paradigm.

Indeed, it would be easier to approach this

task with the clarity and the distance which an historical

perspective affords.

Clearly, it becomes impossible to at-

tempt such an effort without acknowledging one's own partici-

pation in the subject matter itself, i.e., the paradigm.

In

admitting this source of "bias", however, we only reflect the

paradox of the reality of our involvement in the ongoing construction of our world.
Given all the above caveats

,

we will attempt, if just

for the sake of exploration, to elicit the paradigm of the

science whose job it is to scientifically explicate our so-

cially constructed reality.

We also undertake this task be-

and
cause it is preferable to tacitly supporting the social

economic structure by generating more "scientific psychological data."

Hence we are forced to look at this science,

rather than to look through it.
be noted
At the outset of such an exploration, it should

that if we can elicit
that our overriding assumption suggests
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information contributing to

a

discernible paradigm, we will

find it to be representative and confirming of the conditions
of a highly advanced, technological capitalist system.

We

expect to find a paradigm consonant with these conditions because we have assumed the premise of psychology's participation in and elaboration of

a

seemingly objective reality

which is continually socially constructed.

Such conditions

paradigm which concerns itself with

would be reflected in

a

method and technique

rather than substantive content and

,

process

Kelly'

s

Theory of Personal Constructs and the Rep Test

Fortunately, there exists both

a

theory and

a

related

methodology in psychology which provides the psychological
analog to the social construction or paradigmatic construction of reality.

Such an approach comes out of George Kelly's

theory of personal constructs (1955)
At the outset, Kelly views the individual as a scientist
who, through personal experimentation, constructs dimensions

anticipated
on which his personal and interpersonal world is
and interpreted.
goal as

a

Kelly argues that the individual's primary

scientist is to predict and control events.

der to do this,

In or-

the individual represents his world through

differentiate and
patterns or templates (constructs) which
give meaning to his relationships.

These constructs are in-

calls the inditegrated more comprehensively into what Kelly

7

vidual's "construct system".

These construct systems, then,

are composed of an array of potentially integrated dimensions
on which the individual organizes and understands events.

Kelly notes that some constructs are widely shared
across people, while others are more private and idiosyncratic.

Furthermore, he says that constructs and construct sys-

tems can be modified as certain dimensions lose their sali-

ency and are superceded by other, perhaps more highly articu-

lated dimensions

.

These changes can accrue from

therapeutic process in which the individual

is

a

psycho-

encouraged to

expand or refine his construct system.
In order to assess the nature and quality of an indivi-

dual's construct system, it becomes important to have some

clinical tool which will elucidate for both client and therapist the dimensions which comprise that system.

While the

client himself would have difficulty reporting the constructs
a

he uses,
to

and while it would be inaccurate for the therapist

infer another's constructs, Kelly has provided

a

method

for the elicitation of an individual's constructs.

Kelly's Role Construct Repertory Test, or Rep test (Kelly,

1955), has the individual use significant people in his

life as stimulus items in order to elicit bi-polar dimensions

(constructs) which illustrate the similarity of two of these

people and their distinction from
usage,

a

third.

In its clinical

the interviewer typically asks the client to name be-

tween 15 and 24 significant others who are representative of
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various elements of the individual's experience, both past
and present.

Next, a series of "sorts", or sets of three

stimulus items, is presented.

The client responds with rele-

vant dimensions which distinguish two of the three from the
third.

The constructs obtained from these sorts (usually 15

to 22 sorts)

then provide the clinician with a large number

of dimensions for deciphering how the client perceives and
acts on his world.

Given these data, the clinician looks for qualities
other than content which affect the nature of the construct
system.

For instance, one of the most salient factors dif-

ferentiating construct systems is their degree of cognitive
complexity.

Several investigators have attempted to elabor-

ate on the meaning and implications of cognitive complexity.

Bieri

e_t

aJL.

(1966) have argued that cognitive complexity en-

tails both differentiation (the number of dimensions) and

articulation (the extent of discriminations made within
dimension).

Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961) note

crete-abstract dimension as
complexity.

a

a

a con-

significant aspect of cognitive

The notion of cognitive complexity as a person-

ality variable and its importance in determining behavior
have generated numerous studies (cf. Bonarius, in Maher
1965).

Aside from cognitive complexity

as

a

quality of con-

struct systems, subsequent research has isolated

other factors.

For instance,

a

a

host of

construct is considered "con-
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stellatory'.'

if it fixes the other possible realm membership,

as in stereotyping.

Or, a construct is called

M

preemptive M

if it restricts its elements exclusively to its own domain

(Wiggins, 1973).

plications Grid

Hinkle (1965), through the use of his Im(a

variant of the Rep grid), has extensively

researched the connections between and among constructs and
other dimensions which may be implied.

Understanding these

factors helps the clinician or researcher to better predict
how an individual is processing and acting on his experience.

According to Kelly, then, it
from the Rep test data

a

is

possible to generate

hierarchically ordered construct

system in which subordinate dimensions are subsumed under

superordinate ones.

Having organized the data in this way,

one can then assess aspects of total systems.

For example,

one can consider the permeability or impermeability, or the

tightness or looseness of

a

system, thereby gaining still

more information on the individual's coding of experience.
These factors are of importance in determining the likelihood
of change and in deciding what factors are malleable and

which are not.

Consonant with this focus of change, Kelly

also notes that each bipolar construct contains an emergent
and a submerged pole, that is, a pole that is evident in the

person's behavior, and

a

pole which is not ostensibly repre-

sented in the person's repetoire.

The submerged pole is seen

as indicative of the individual's potential for different ac-

tion as behavior changes.
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The original Rep test itself is too rudimentary to get
all the information needed to figure out the relative posi-

tions of certain constructs to other constructs.
ly,

a lot is

According-

left to the clinician's interpretation.

Never-

theless, a host of variations and expansions on the original
test have been made over time.

For instance, in order to

find the relative importance of different constructs, the in-

dividual is asked to check off on

a

grid form of the test all

of the 22 people for whom the emergent pole of each construct
is relevant.

In this way, one can more accurately infer the

"range of convenience", or the applicability, of each construct.

Further, Kelly has provided a non-parametric factor

analysis in order to more objectively determine the hierarchy
of the construct system for each individual.

Clearly, this methodology has a wide range of applica-

bility both in clinical assessment and in personality research.

It is a particularly elegant technique in its abil-

ity to provide a rather objective but still phenomenological

idiographic measure.

It is a method which allows for both

qualitative interpretation and quantitative analysis.

Fur-

thermore, both the stimulus items and the constructs are gen-

erated by the individual, thereby reducing the type of bias
inherent in rating forms, and increasing the likelihood of
richer and more personal information.
Rep test has far-reaching potential for

ent interests.

In general terms,
a

the

variety of differ-

Indeed, all that needs to be altered is the
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nature of the stimulus items for which one gives dimensions
(cf.

Bannister and Mair, 1968).
One example illustrating the wide range of potential use

is Kelly's Situational Resources Rep Test.

In this varia-

tion, Kelly uses as stimulus items a representative array of

stressful situations.

The subject is asked to think of a

specific instance in his life which fits the situational
category.

Written in on

one row on the grid.

a

grid form, each situation fills

The columns are composed of the names

of a number of significant people in the subject's life.

The

subject is then asked to indicate to whom he feels he could
have gone for help or support.

What emerges from each sub-

ject's grid is what Kelly calls a "distribution of depend-

encies" (1955)

.

While this grid form yields information

about environmental supports rather than constructs per se

,

it suggests the flexibility the basic methodology has for

research endeavors

From Kelly to Kuhn
For our purposes we want to amend the Rep test in order
to elicit the paradigm of psychology.

In order to do this,

let us first review the theory of personal constructs in

light of our task.

While Kelly's theory implies

a

psycholo-

gical construction of individual reality, we have noted earlier our interest in uncovering the dimensions of a socially

and/or scientifically constructed reality.

Kelly gives us

a
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method for .figuring out how the individual makes and uses his
constructs.

Thus far in the sociology of knowledge and in

the philosophy of science, most of the methods available have
be en historical hindsight and armchair speculation.

Kelly's work is applicable to the problem of psychology's

paradigm if we assume the following analogy, that
construct system
the field

.

is

to the

individual

as a

,

is:

that a

paradigm is to

While no one has heretofore developed

a

method-

ology which concretizes this analogy, the connections between

construct system and paradigms, and between Kelly and Kuhn,
have been made (Holland, and Leman, in Bannister, 1970).
Also, the view of man as

a

scientist,

a

notion central to

Kelly's theory, has been seen as potentially useful in studying the field of psychology and in assessing its legitimacy

and sophistication as a science.

Shotter (in Bannister, 1970) has made
linkages between Kelly and Kuhn.

a

number of these

First, because Kelly views

man as a scientist, he makes numerous references to the nature of science itself.

According to Shotter, "One can find

all but identical views to Kelly's in Kuhn (1962), where he

has documented the changing paradigm in the natural sciences,

arguing that they were all 'scientific' in their own terms"
(p.

223 in Bannister,

1970).

In other words, one can apply

Kuhn's stage description of the finding of anomalies, the

subsequent "revolution" that occurs, and the resulting change
in world view,

to the growth and change of an individual's
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construct system in psychotherapy or in
(James,

a

psychotic break

1975).

Indeed, Shotter notes that Kelly's commentary on science

itself is similar to Kuhn's, in that both realize that science does not provide "real" descriptions of "reality" but

rather offers schemes for the ordering of experience.

These

"schemata" make up either the construct system of the individual or the paradigm of the science, depending on the unit
of analysis.

model- -Kuhn'

paradigm.

Kelly's model of man is that of man with a
s

model of science is that of scientists with

a

Both are representations or constructions of re-

ality, one being personal and individual, the other imper-

sonal and collective.

Although these connections are fairly obvious, no one
has ever extended Kelly's Rep test methodology to look at

paradigms.

In addition, while the self - ref lexivity of Kel-

ly's notion of man as scientist invites one to evaluate the

construct system of
ter,

a

science itself (Kelly, 1966, in Bannis-

1970), this work has only been done in an unsystematic

and cursory fashion.

proposed

a

Bannister (1970), for instance, has

definitional requirement of

a

science in terms of

construct theory and has tried to assess how "scientific"

psychology is in these terms.

However, while Bannister has

tried to apply construct theory to science, he has sought

only to determine whether or not psychology is

a

science.

His analysis suggests that because psychology is composed of
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so many tiny and unorganized pieces of data, we are currently

faced with numerous "psychologies" (cf. Kuhn's preparadig-

matic phase)
search.

,

rather than a unified system of thought and re-

Although we will return later to Bannister's cri-

tique of the state of the field, it should be noted that he
too has stopped short of trying to elicit, in a Kellian way,

the construct system or paradigm of the field.

Given the novelty of the present modification of Kelly,
the proposed research, described below, is designed to be an

initial exploration, both of systematically investigating

psychology's paradigm, and in extending Kelly's methodology
to look at a system of thought that exists across people, ra-

ther than within one person.
a

In the section which follows,

methodology for such purposes

is,

described.
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CHAPTER

II

METHODOLOGY

A Revised Rep Test for

a

Paradigm

The first step in modifying the Rep test for our pur-

poses was to change the stimulus items.

The list of repre-

sentative significant others used in the typical test would
be useful if we wanted "subjects", or respondents, to give

constructs for important people in their lives.
list of other people

Kelly uses

a

because it is experience and interac-

,

tion with people that makes up an individual's view of his

psychosocial world.

In this case, we wanted our psychologist-

subjects to generate

a

list of representative concepts

,

for

it is concepts which make up the psychologist's work in the

field as well as his "psychological- scientific view" of
things.

By "concept" we mean any abstraction or representa-

tion of something, or phenomenon, ranging from representing

something fairly operational to highly theoretical, which informs the psychologist's work.

Indeed,

the job of the

it is

psychologist to create and interact with concepts
sumably grow out of the paradigm of the field.

,

which pre-

Hence, the

major modification in our paradigm Rep test was the use of
"concepts" in place of people.
Parallel to Kelly's administration of the Rep test, our

psychologist-subjects were asked to generate
sentative concepts.

a

list of repre-

What was meant by representative?

In
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Kelly's Rep test, a representative list of people includes

people from different periods in the individual's life
(school teacher, first girl/boyfriend), people in different

status and role positions to the individual (boss, father,
spouse, friend), different idealized types (most intelligent,

most ethical), and different emotional feelings and attitudes
(like, dislike, respect,

trust).

For our purposes, a partially analogous array of repre-

sentative concepts (see p. 92-93,
1)

list of concepts)

included:

concepts from different periods in psychology's develop-

ment (concepts

7,

8,

9,

10);

2)

concepts which have varying

weight in influencing the field (ephemeral/fad versus lasting)

;

3)

concepts with utility for psychologists in their

work tasks (concepts

1,

3,

13,

14);

4)

concepts that have in-

fluenced the personal development of psychologists (concepts
2,

4,

15);

5)

some currently used concepts with different

saliences (concepts

5,

6);

and

into theoretical orientations

6)

molar concepts which tap

(concepts 11, 12).

All of

these concepts also tapped into degrees of preference for the

subjects.

In summary,

then,

the concept list used in this

study asked for concepts with different historical value to
the field and to the individual psychologist, different util-

ity in various parts of the psychologist's work, and different personal priorities and valences to the individual.

After

a

list of concepts was obtained from a subject,

s/he was then asked to think of bipolar constructs for fif-
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teen sorts (triads) from the original list of fifteen concepts (see pp. 95-96).

in compiling the sorts to be used in

this part, an attempt to provide some rationale was made.

Three factors went into this rationale:

1)

an attempt was

made not to repeat any pairs within the triads--this eventually led to some arbitrariness;

an attempt was made not to

2)

put together triads in which the split between two similar
items and one different item was overly obvious (e.g., like

and dislike)

.

This was done so that the constructs obtained

would not, as far as possible, be tautological, or repetitious of the concepts, themselves.

Indeed, what we wanted

was for the subject to work at generating dimensions underlying the concepts, for in so doing, we could tap into the di-

mensions upon which we construct the field.

While the diffi-

culty of this rather abstract task was acknowledged, some

initial piloting suggested that it was possible.
Third, some of the sorts had
instance, sort

I

a

specific rationale.

For

put together three concepts at different

time periods in the field.

historical factors.

psychologist's work.

Sort II put together personal-

Sort III compiled three tasks in the
Sort XIII tapped into "influence" in

personal life, in working with others, and in the field itself.

Many of the sorts contained concepts which could be

seen to pull for varying relationships between the field and
the individual, between different parts of the field, and be-

tween different time periods in the field.
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A few issues seemed problematic at this point.

First,

each subject would have his own list from which he would pro-

vide dimensions.
jects?

How could we then compile data across sub-

The rationale behind consolidating the data across

subjects derived from our expectation that there would be

similar dimensions underlying the concepts used in the field.
(If there were not,

and if it were then impossible to compile

data across subjects, that, in itself, would be an interesting finding.)

Furthermore, in order to elicit the constructs

that comprise that paradigm, we wanted to use concepts that

were relevant to our subjects.

Were we to provide

a

particu-

lar list of concepts, we would have run the risk of subjects'

unfamiliar ity with the terms.
concept for, say,

Second, what if one subject's

useful research concept, had been at odds

a

with, or theoretically opposite to, another subject's useful

research concept?

Again, since we assumed that related di-

mensions underlie all concepts, we could have possibly found
that even the identical construct emerged from seemingly op-

positional concepts.
Aside from translating the original Rep test into the
form described above, we also modified the Rep grid used by

Kelly in order to get further information on each subject
(and later across Ss) on the range of convenience of the con-

structs obtained.

In Kelly's grid,

the constructs the indi-

vidual provides are written on the right side of

a

grid

chart, and the emergent and submerged poles of each construct
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are indicated.

In this format,

the rows are made up of con-

structs and the columns contain the stimulus items.

In Kel-

ly's test, those items are people.

Constructs

teacher

father

mother

sibling

spouse

friend

boss

emergent- - submergent
Sort

I

1. 2,4

+

+

*

0

good

Sort II

fat

bad

i

thin

i

The sub j ect is asked to put an

+

in the boxes which in-

dicate the two of the three stimulus items which make up the

emergent pole of the construct, and an

o

in the box which in-

dicates the stimulus item in the sort which make up the sub-

merged pole.

Then, the subject is asked to place a star

in all the other boxes

(*)

(representing stimulus items to whom

the emergent pole also applies).

This determines the range

of convenience of the construct.

Note that in the example

given above, sort

I

consisted of stimulus items

or mother, father, and teacher.
as good and teacher as bad.

1,

2,

and

4

Mother and father were seen

In determining the range of con-

venience of this construct, we find that it is applicable to
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two other people [friend, spouse).

This grid form was used in the present study, but subjects wrote down their concepts in place of people.

In simi-

lar fashion to Kelly, Ss put stars where the emergent pole

they generated was relevant.
97)

(See grid form of booklet, p.

.

Evaluation of This Approach and Methodology

Although Kelly (1966, in Bannister, 1970) and Bannister
(1970)

see construct theory as a potential tool for evaluat-

ing psychology as a science and as a system of thought, the

theory and method has not been concretized into anything like
the approach outlined above.

While the extension of Kelly's

theory and method was an experiment in itself, it only repre-

sented one way of getting at the paradigm in psychology.

other approach to this problem

is

An-

presented in order to as-

sess the advantages and disadvantages of the present study.
In an extensive effort to uncover basic trends in psy-

chological theory both over time and at any given point in
time, Coan (1968) undertook a quantitative, multivariate de-

sign in which 54 psychological theorists on 34 variables co-

vered

important variables of psychological theory.

The 54

theorists had been drawn from an original list of 142 theorists and had been selected from earlier research which de-

termined the rated importance of their contributions to psychological theory (Coan

$

Zagona, 1962).

The 34 variables
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were derived from four general categories said by Coan to

comprise psychological theory:

content emphasis (topic),

methodological emphasis, basic assumptions, and mode of conceptualization.

Subjects rated the applicability of these 34

variables to 54 theorists on

analytic work done on

a

a

scale from -2 to +2.

Factor

basic score matrix of 54 X 34 yielded

six factors:

subj ectivistic vs. ob j ectivistic
holistic vs. elementar istic
transpersonal vs. personal
quantitative vs. qualitative
dynamic vs. static
endogenist vs. exogenist

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

These six factors were intercorrelated and an analysis of
their correlations yielded two factors at a second stratum.

These two higher order dimensions were:
tic and functional vs
a

.

restrictive

.

synthetic vs. analy -

Beyond that, Coan posits

relationship between the division of theorists along this

dimension and the temperament of the theorist.

The dimen-

sions of psychological theory he constructs are reported below:

FLUID

Functional

endogenism

dynamic

personal

Synthetic

qualitative

holism

subjectivism
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RESTRICTIVE

Analytic

objectivism

elemental

Structural

quan-

transpersonal

titative

static""exogenism

'

Coan also notes historical trends from 1880-1960.

His

findings indicate an increasing shift from subjectivist to

objectivist, from qualitative to quantitative, from endogenist to exogenist.

Further, he reports cyclical patterns on

the holis t-elementarist dimension which go from elementarist
to holist

(in the 1920's)

back to elementarist.

The personal-

transpersonal dimension also changes in cycles, according to
his data.

Coan's work is clearly relevant to the present study.
His methodology is more calsified and objective, which is

both to his advantage and disadvantage.
his data, he has gleaned from

a

What he finds from

statistical analysis of rat-

ings and hence (according to contemporary notions of what

constitutes science)

,

he can make his conclusions with

a de-

finitiveness which the present study may lack.
Nevertheless, in light of the present study, there is

much to critique in Coan's research.

First of all, he makes

no mention of the relationship of his statistical methodology

either to the historical period in which he works or to the

way it biases, modifies, and constructs the dimension he
finds.

Second, he makes no connection between the historical
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changes he finds and the social and economic developments of
those periods.

It would be so easy to infer from his results

the ways in which the theories in the field mirror an increas-

ingly dehumanized, technological culture--but he eschews making such inferences.

In this way, his work has no roots and

no critical function and is reducable to mere tautology.

Third, his study is suspect in terms of the unexplained

way he picks the 34 obviously crucial variables which Ss
later apply to theorists.

In fact,

the very variables he

picks determine the dimensions which emerge.

From an experi-

mental point of view, it is a bit presumptuous to provide
variables which supposedly make up psychological theory and
to then argue that the study has discovered or produced di-

mensions.

The dimensions he reports are mere summary state-

ments of the 34 variables he chooses.

Whatever the present study sacrificed in terms of "objective statistical" findings it has hopefully compensated
for with its more open-ended methodology.

For in revising

Kelly's Rep test, we allowed the subject to generate both the

dimensions and the stimulus items.
items were relevant to each subject.

In this way,

stimulus

Second, this study has

asserted an ideological position and has come out of

a

par-

ticular framework, rather than appearing out of nowhere and

avoiding those issues.

Since those issues inhere in any in-

quiry, it is perhaps more honest to state them squarely.

Hence, if the current work is not "scientifically accurate",
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it is at least ideologically honest.

Methodology for This Study
Having created

a

new test, and having provided a ration-

ale for both the stimulus items and the sorts to be used, let
us outline more specifically to whom the test was given and

the administration of the test.

The test was administered to a total of 32 respondents.

The total sample included 10 females and 22 males, with only
three women in the non-clinical groups.

Subjects were all

psychologists in the "soft", "person-oriented" areas of psychology:

clinical, social, personality, organizational, edu-

cational.

This choice was somewhat arbitrary, due to the

exploratory nature of the study, and somewhat because these
areas all deal with related aspects of people and behavior.

The 32 participants were composed of four sub-groups of eight
each- - clinical faculty; upper-level clinical graduate stu-

dents; non-clinical faculty; and non-clinical upper-level

graduate students.

We chose upper- level graduate students

(third and fourth year) because the difficulty of the task

mandated

a

familiarity with the concepts and the field which

beginning students might not have had.

While it might have

been interesting to have compared constructs from different

groups of Ss based on number of years in the field (e.g.,

faculty vs. undergraduates), it was beyond the scope of this
studv to test for all level differences.
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Administrat ion
The test was administered individually
to each psycholo
gist-subject. Administration consisted of
eight parts:
1)

A general overview of the purpose of the
study was

given.

Without going into the theoretical and
ideological
framework from which this study emerges, the
task of trying
to elicit a "paradigm" for soft psychology
was explained and

discussed with subjects.
2)

Kelly's construct theory and Rep test was explained

The transformations made to provide

poses was then discussed, and
of the stimulus items
3)

a

a

Rep test for our pur-

rationale given for the use

(concepts)

Each subject was asked to give fifteen different

concepts based on the list in the test.
was defined for Ss

.

The term "concept"

"Concept" was used in this Rep test to

include any abstract term, or any level of abstraction, rang
ing from a specific operational term to a hypothetical term
to a global theory of behavior.

Examples were not given so

as not to bias the concepts given by Ss.

However, any ques-

tions raised were answered and discussed.

cepts offered were written down on page

1

The fifteen con(list of concepts

sheet) of the booklet.
4)

Each subject was then asked to supply bipolar dimen

sions which indicated

cepts

a

way in which two of the three con-

(for each of fifteen sorts) were alike and different

from the third.

In administering this part,

the interviewer
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asked the subject to indicate which two concepts were
being

grouped together (emergent pole) with which pole of
the construct.

The responses were written down on page four of Ss

booklet (cf. booklet), which showed the sorting of the
triads
and the constructs.

Constructs could be repeated if desired.

Each subject filled in the revised grid form (page

5)

of the booklet)

.

The fifteen concepts

S

5

used were written

into the columns of the grid, and the constructs (emergent

and submerged poles indicated) were written on the right making up fifteen rows.

sorts were indicated.

Down the far left side, the fifteen
Ss were instructed to place a

*

in the

boxes under the two concepts used in the emergent pole of the

construct, and

a "o"

under the box of the one concept which

made up the submerged pole.
sorts

This was done for all fifteen

.

Ss were asked to place a star

6)

(*)

in all other con-

cept boxes to which the fifteen emergent poles applied or

were relevant.

It was explained that this was done in order

to find a range of convenience for the individual's con-

structs
7)

.

After the grid was completed, the task part was
A few personal data were noted:

over.

areas in psychology, sex, if
is not

in clinical area,

S

years in the field,

has had clinical training and

and where the individual saw him/

herself within his/her area.
8)

Finally, there was time for two-way feedback.

Sub-
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jects were asked to report any thoughts or feelings about doing the task, and the interviewer answered any questions.
Ss'

comments were noted by the interviewer for

report about the task itself.

a

qualitative

Personal data about the sub-

ject and the subject's feedback were written on the final

sheet of the booklet.

Statement of Goals
In summarizing the investigative inquiry outlined in the

preceding pages, perhaps

a

"expectations" is in order.

formal statement of "goals" and
We say goals and expectations

instead of "hypotheses" because of the exploratory nature of
this study.

Indeed, the purpose of an "experiment"

try something out, to see what

novel

is

attempted.

will

is

to

result if something

The present work has been an experiment

in this basic sense and has remained open-ended because of it.

One major goal of this research, however, was to begin
to elicit,

in as coherent a fashion as possible,

given a spe-

culative methodology, the paradigm of person-oriented or soft
psychology.

Within this goal, there was one central expecta-

tion, namely, that if we found a paradigm, its dimensions

would reflect

a

conception and construction of people that

is

in concert with an increasingly technological society in

which people are dehumanized, interchangeable, and fragmented.

In line with this, we anticipated a paradigm centered

around issues of method and technique rather than content.
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In more operational terms,

issues of methodology would be ex-

pressed in constructs like "testable-untes table"
ical-hypothetical".

or "empir-

,

A preponderance of constructs like these

would support the expectation noted here.
Some people might not even consider these dimensions

worthy of being called

a

paradigm.

Indeed, in Bannister's

assessment (1970), or indictment, of psychology as

a science,

he argues that the field is so fragmented that there are no

core constructs on which the field builds.

Instead, the

field is only concerned with generating "numberless experi-

mental studies which are devoted to one or another type of
short term payoff and which are asking questions of such

a

nature that it does not matter one iota what the experimental
answer turns out to be"

(p.

-Finally, Bannister con-

54).

cludes that psychology is not

a

science but a technology.

critiquing the field's research, he writes,

".

In

.such as ap-

.

plied criterion of the purpose of prediction and question
asking is essentially what discriminates
science.

a

technology from

a

A technology does not need to concern itself with

the question of the elaboration of its own conceptual frame-

work, it can substitute for this requirement of

immediate socioeconomic return.

a

science any

A reflection of this atti-

tude appears in the emphasis placed in teaching research on

techniques rather than on issues"
to these issues

(p.

54).

It is precisely

that this research has been directed

.

There were another set of expectations if some coherence
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of constructs were found.

First, we expected that faculty

constructs would be more embedded in and representative of
this technologically and methodologically-based paradigm than

students'.

This expectation

younger members of

a

came from Kuhn's notion that

discipline are less socialized into and

confined by the prevailing paradigm.

This expectation was

qualified, however, since the paradigm of psychology

is

not

removed from the larger culture but rather, as stated earlier, extends into and mirrors the culture's approach to peo-

ple.

Hence, we might have found that younger students, while

not totally socialized into the field, may have picked up the
same constructs and values simply by being members of the

larger culture.

In addition, we might have expected differ-

ences in constructs between clinicians and non-clinicians.

Again, this may have reflected Bannister's and Adams-Webber's
(1970)

sense of the fragmentation of the field and the exist-

ence of what Bannister calls "psychologies" rather than an

integrated psychology.

Another central goal of this research was to explore the
feasibility of extending Kelly's Rep test for use in getting
a

cognitive consensus across people.

Also in this study, we

tried to see if Kelly's methodology could be usefully extended to a higher level of abstraction,

that is, if subjects

could generate constructs for intangible concepts rather than
for actual people.

This requires an abstract ability which

we expected psychologists to be capable of.
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Finally, we were interested in showing the extent to

which the field of psychology constructs

a

social reality

based on conceptions of people which reinforce and reproduce
the social and economic structure in which it occurs.

It is

out of this philosophical and ideological framework that

these research questions emerged in the first place.
in this context that our findings have meaning.

It is
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CHAPTER

III

DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS

Data Collection Process
This is an exploratory study, focused largely on con-

ceptual development.

It required participants to develop

rather complex distinctions and judgments based on their personal frames of reference.

Similarly, the collection and

analysis of these data, as will be described, entailed

highly interpretive and interactive process

.

a

Given this

character of the study, it becomes somewhat more important
than usual for the reader to know the process by which the

data were obtained, organized and interpreted.

As a result,

the following discussion includes -some statement of my phe-

nomenological experience in collecting the data, as well as
the more public aspects of that process.

Hence, the follow-

ing section describes this interactional process of adminis-

tering the Rep tests and of then deciding how to best make
sense of them.

While

I

closely followed the task procedures outlined

earlier, test administration turned out to be considerably

more tedious than

I

had anticipated.

Almost immediately,

cut down the size of my total sample from 40 to 32.

encounter with each participant took from one and
two hours.

a

I

Each
half to

What was most crucial for me in this process was

to figure out how each person was conceptualizing and working

32

with the stimulus items, and to help them draw out their
constructs if necessary.
me,

in that

I

This was

a

highly abstract process for

had to think about possible dimensions for

every sort, for each subject.

This was important to do be-

cause most people found the task unusual and had trouble

thinking of bipolar dimensions which distinguished psychology
concepts

Each respondent was required to do two related tasks.
First s/he was to generate a list of fifteen concepts which
the person uses or sees used in the field.

which

I

Even this part,

had expected to be relatively uncomplicated, was dif-

ficult for people.

Subjects indicated that they were bother-

ed by not being able to repeat concepts.

The second task,

supplying bipolar constructs which sorted sets of three concepts, was even more laborious.

Moving to this "meta" level

of abstraction was difficult for almost everyone.

People

were not accustomed to comparing unrelated concepts in psyOften respondents could generate only

chology.

sions and then just stuck with those.

a

few dimen-

Others expressed

need not to repeat constructs and instead produced
of constructs which were basically synonymous.

a

a

series

Subjects who

produced more varied constructs indicated that they enjoyed
found it challenging, and thought the study was in-

the task,

teresting

.

Many of the faculty and

a few

students offered explana-

tions of their construct systems, especially when they used
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only a few constructs.

For instance, one faculty said that

he was bothered by the "narrowness" of his constructs,
but

that this was due to his having used behavioral concepts.

These, he said, were like "blinders" but were designed that

way for

purpose.

a

The constructs, then, based on the re-

strictive concepts, were even narrower.
a student,

constructs.

Another respondent,

also noted the restricted focus of concern in his
He felt that this did not reflect a narrow focus

of the field itself, but rather reflected his narrow involve-

ment in the field.

To quote, "There is a narrow range of

constructs which govern my scientific behavior."

In short,

relatively limited construct systems seemed troublesome to
respondents and seemed to call for explanation.

Other people commented on problems in the logic of the
task.

One subject said that comparing the concepts was like

comparing "apples, oranges, and tomatoes."

Another respond-

ent said that this was like comparing "apples and fruit."

Finally,

a

third person said that it was like comparing "ap-

ples and doorknobs."

In any event, all these point to the

highly abstract nature of the task and to the unusualness of

comparing and contrasting concepts in the field.
ty, who enjoyed the task,

One facul-

felt that the meaning of the con-

cepts changed in the different triads and that this was in-

teresting to him.

Others, who appeared to have more trouble

with the task, suggested that it was contrived because of the
forced comparisions required.
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There- were apparent relationships between subjects' being able to produce constructs relatively easily and
both en-

joying the task and perceiving the constructs as accurate re-

flections of their thinking.

One faculty, who felt this way,

thought the test was accurate enough that the coherence of

construct systems could predict research productivity.

On

the other hand, there seemed to be a correspondence between

more limited construct systems and feelings that the test was

limiting and not reflective of respondents' thinking.

One

faculty commented on the high threat level in confronting
one's own dimensions and their limitations.

however, seemed to attribute
task,

a

Most subjects,

paucity of constructs to the

the concepts, or the study itself.

In sum, partici-

pants had a variety of reactions to the task.

These reac-

tions seemed to be related in important ways to the kinds of

constructs they produced and to their feelings about participating in the study.

To some extent,

these responses influ-

enced my approach to analyzing the data.

Analy zab ility of the Data
In keeping with the variation of Kelly's Rep test em-

ployed in the study,
with the data in

a

I

had anticipated being able to work

similar fashion to the procedure Kelly

used in the original Rep test.

Ideally,

I

thought it would

be possible to compile constructs across subjects and to then

treat these combined constructs as if they came from one con-

35

glomerate protocol.

Given this assumption,

I

expected to be

able to systematically analyze different segments
of the total data.

students'

For instance,

had hoped to be able to compile

I

constructs for each of the fifteen sorts and to

then compare the conglomerate construct system to

one comprised of faculty's constructs.

a

similar

The same thing was to

be done between the clinicians and the non- clinicians in the

sample.

However, once the data were arranged in this manner,

what emerged was an unintegrated set of bipolar dimensions.

Compiled in this way, most of the contextual meaning of individual constructs was lost.

Hence, this approach to the data

was abandoned.

Another plan

had envisioned was to look at all 480

I

constructs together.

The total number was to be cut down, as

there would be repetitions of constructs.

However, what be-

came clear in looking at the data in this way was that the
same dimension had

different shade of meaning and played

a

a

different role within its own context, that is, in the construct system whence it came.

Hence, while it was possible

to glean valuable information on the types of constructs,

from looking at the total sample, this did not help in the

construction of

a

consensual construct system, or paradigm.

A third plan was to look at differences in the kinds of
dimensions between

"

sorts

.

"

With some intentionality

,

sorts

had been arranged to tap into various differences in the
field.

For instance,

I

was interested in the kinds of con-
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structs generated from a comparison of concepts which
used to
be popular in the field to those currently popular.

tion,

I

In addi-

was interested in comparisons between research versus

applied concepts.

However, the dimensions obtained seemed

independent of the sort in which they were generated.

When

the data were ordered in this way, little emerged as suggestive of a way to intelligently proceed in comparing constructs

from different sorts.

To some extent, the sorts were arbi-

trary, and evidently this was reflected in the constructs.

While

I

had also hoped that

a

comparison of concepts for each

of the fifteen concepts titles would prove interesting, this
too provided little fruitful direction for the analysis.

Another important approach to the data which
thought would be illuminating was also abandoned.

had

I

This en-

tailed compiling data, across subjects, based on the "range
of convenience" grids filled out by each respondent.

As

noted earlier, the last part of the actual task for each person involved checking other concepts in his/her list to which
the emergent pole of each dimension could be applied.

Ac-

cording to Kelly, this is important in determining how widely applicable a construct is in a person's thinking.

this was seen to be

a.

Thus,

good way of prioritizing and hierarch-

ically ordering constructs in the overall sample.

However, there were several reasons why this did not
seem productive once the data were in.

First, respondents

were both impatient and tired by the time they were asked to
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fill out the Rep grid.

Because of this, my impression was

that the grids were done hastily and were probably not
re-

flective of

bility for

a
a

careful assessment of a dimension's applicasubject.

Second, since many constructs were

repeated (or synonymous constructs used)

it appeared that

,

the salience of a construct could be determined simply by the

frequency with which it was used.

In fact,

in looking at the

Rep grids, constructs used only once seemed to have a very

limited range of convenience, while constructs used

appeared to have wide ranges of convenience.

a

lot

Third, it was

not possible to compile a master range of convenience grid

across subjects, because the reliability and validity of this

notion was ambiguous enough within each protocol, and because
the same dimensions had different "meanings only within proto-

cols and not between them.

Given these judgments, it did not

make sense, nor bring the data closer to

a

consensual con-

struct system, to pursue this course of action.
In experimenting with all the various breakdowns and re-

arrangements of the data, it seemed that each construct system itself was a total Gestalt or unit and needed to be con-

sidered in that way.

In attempting to go beyond an under-

standing of an individual's thinking, then, it would still be

necessary to build from an idiographic base.

Therefore, it

was from such an individualistic perspective that the data

were interpreted.

Other possibilities undoubtably existed,

but this approach seemed to be an appropriate and potentially
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fruitful one.

Since the approach selected is

highly inter-

pretive, a detailed explanation of the procedures
adopted in
making sense of the data is presented below.

Data Explication

:

Criteria

Perhaps the most informative way of working with and

analyzing the data has stemmed from an individualistic, al-

most clinical approach to each of the 32 construct systems.
This understanding of the data is similar to Kelly's original

procedures of how to use Rep tests.

In this case, however,

the constructs are certainly different than what Kelly would

have collected, in that they are substantially more abstract
and do not have any tangible referents, as do constructs de-

rived from "role titles."

Hence, in making interpretations

and drawing conclusions, it behooves us to closely examine
the kind of data obtained.

An explication of this interpret-

ive process necessitates both close scrutiny of individual

construct systems and continual comparison to other Rep
tests.

This process of comparing and contrasting the produc-

tions of different subjects is crucial, for it has been out
of this close interaction with the data that common and sig-

nificant themes have emerged.

The inferential process en-

tails pulling apart and then integrating each individual's

system as well as comparing two or more systems of thought.
I

carried out this analysis with the help of my commit-

tee chairperson.

Because of the abstract and interactive
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nature of the task, it appeared important
for someone besides
me to stay close to the data to provide
comparative judgments
In analyzing the data, it felt like one
either had to be al-

most literally on top of or in the midst of
the data, or
good distance away from them.
For these reasons,

a

all commit-

tee

members had an opportunity to look at and "interact"

with the data.
This task was difficult for other reasons as well.

It

appears that it is nearly impossible to hold more than just
a few

"thought systems" in one's mind simultaneously.

This

is a very important point in understanding the data and the

types of conclusions drawn from them.

It is also a serious

limitation in this study and possibly in the Rep test itself.
Perhaps this is at least

a

partial -explanation of why Kelly's

test remains most valuable as an idiographic instrument.
deed, Wiggins

In-

(1973) points out that "the nature of personal

construct theory and the procedures of the Rep test make it
clear that Kelly considered this assessment approach to be of

value in the assessment of individuals, considered one at a
time "

(p.

494)

(underlining mine).

Wiggins' point suggests

the difficulty one has in holding in mind and juggling more

than even one construct system.

Nevertheless, the signific-

ance of various nuances within one system can only be assessed in relation to others and thus, this is a valuable way to

proceed.
Hence, while we acknowledge certain problems in making
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sweeping statements from groups of construct systems, simply

because this

is

so difficult to do,

to proceed with a close,

the individual protocols.

it is still elucidating

detailed examination of several of
This is crucial to do, in that

this may be the only way to allow the reader to know and

evaluate the process by which interpretations and conclusions

were reached.

Therefore, what follows below is

a

dissection

of some of the data and of my interactive process with it.

The kinds of questions to keep in mind in guiding the expose

focus on the following kinds of issues:

how is the individual

respondent thinking as

What are the salient

a

psychologist?

dimensions which inform his/her thinking?
do

What implications

these dimensions have for how the individual will view, or

ignore, important phenomena potentially available to him/her
as a psychologist?

How is this person's way of construing

different from or similar to others in the sample?

What do

these differences imply about how various psychologists might
or might not communicate with each other?

With these questions as an overall guide, we can employ
more specific criteria in judging the data.

The criteria de-

rive from and focus on two different aspects of the protocols, the content of the constructs themselves and the quality of the constructs and the construct systems as whole

Gestalts or units.

Because these two sets of criteria are

the most coherent and systematic threads we have in making

sense of the data, these criteria will be defined in detail
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before applying them to the protocols.
In understanding to what the content
of the constructs

address themselves,

constructs" which
structs.

I

I

have derived

a

typology of "kinds of

drew from the total sample of 480 con-

In looking at all the constructs, it appeared
that

one could classify constructs, albeit loosely,
into four
types.

The four types differentiate the focus or orientation

of the constructs.

The implications of having a preponder-

ance of one kind of construct as opposed to another will
be

considered later.

At this point, it is important to make

these differentiations clear.

The first kind of construct

is

that which focuses di-

rectly; on some aspect of people and behavior

Constructs

.

which have this type of focus take some stand on how people
function in the world or how the world affects people.

These

constructs are perhaps closest to some of the philosophical

underpinnings of psychology as
Type

I

constructs include:

a

discipline.

Examples of

active/passive, inner-directed/

other-directed, behavior as modifiable/predetermined, dynamic/
static,

internal/external control of behavior, person as con-

troller/person as victim, imply dependence/independence, individual as interactive/individual as singular.
ples come from the protocols.)

(All exam-

All these constructs take

some theoretical stance on how people and behavior operate.

This type of construct, with its direct focus on people,
is

to be distinguished from a second kind

(Type II)

,

those
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which focus, on how people and behavior
are studied

.

This

type of construct is once- removed, so
to speak, from a direct
focus on people.
Many of these constructs, as could be expected, deal with methodological issues
and with the way people are studied.
In other words, these constructs deal
with
whence the concepts came, rather than to what
or to whom they
are applied.

Examples of Type

II

constructs are:

laboratory

analog/directly observable, causal model/ interactive model,
inferred/observed, empirical/ theoretical

,

measurable/not mea-

surable, knowledge-oriented/action-oriented.

These types of

constructs are almost commentaries on the concepts themselves,
rather than on people and behavior.

But they are a certain

kind of commentary, in that they do provide information on
the field and how it views people.

-

Although they are one

step removed from direct dimensions about people, they are

not so bland or devoid of content that they tell us nothing
and could just as well be dimensions of something else be-

sides psychological concepts.

Third type of construct
enough in the 480 to comprise

(

Type III )
a

,

of which there were

category, are dimensions

which are only descriptive of the concepts themselves and
in a sense,

twice-removed from teaching us psychology's

views on people.

Many of these constructs are simply adjec-

are,

tives which really could be applied to many other things.
best, some of these constructs have evaluative components,

indicating some concern by the respondent toward some issue

At
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brought up by the concepts.

The evaluative part of these

constructs may tell us something about how the
field divides
up and looks at people and behavior.
For instance, examples
from this category include:
complex/mechanistic, simplistic/
complex, reductionistic/holistic, definite/indefinite,
sci-

entific/mystical, concrete/abstract, molar/molecular, multi-

dimensional/unidimensional, wide applicability/narrow range,
functional/artificial.

It can be seen that these constructs

are not about people or methodology but rather about concepts

themselves.

Perhaps the task itself is to blame for the

large number of Type III constructs.

Perhaps respondents

found it so difficult and abstract to compare the content and

vantage points of different concepts that they resorted to

describing attributes of the concepts themselves.
Finally,

a

fourth type of dimension

(

Type IV ) in the

data consists of those constructs which are nomative in nature, that is, those in which names of sub-areas are substi-

tuted for the concepts themselves.

For instance, if the

three concepts to be compared in a particular sort were

M

ego n

"cognitive dissonance" and "drive theory", the nomative construct given might be "psychological/biological."
struct tells us very little about people
field,

,

This con-

behavior

,

or the

except that "psychological" and "biological" are head-

ings of sub - areas or concerns within the field

.

While they

may show how the field is divided up, they provide little information about how the particular psychologist views and in-

,
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terprets concepts in his/her work.

These sorts of constructs

are merely one level more abstract or
generalized than the
concepts themselves. Essentially, they
are higher-order sy-

nonyms.

Examples of Type IV constructs include:

physiolo-

gical/social, psychological/biological, content
area/viewpoint, investigative tool/substantive content,

p*erceptual/

emotional, physical/sociocultural

psychological process/

,

theoretical approach, cognitive/physiological.

My subjective

impression in administering the Rep tests was that often
when
a

respondent, for whatever reason, did not identify specific

dimensions, s/he resorted to giving nomative constructs.
In summary,

1

then, this part of this section has develop-

ed a set of criteria which distinguishes various kinds of

constructs from each other, based on their focus and orientation.

We are still left to enumerate

a

second set of crite-

ria, those which deal with the quality of the construct systerns,

considered one at

a

time.

These sets of criteria are adapted directly from Kelly's
analyses of Rep tests.
focus on:

,

these criteria

the cognitive complexity of a construct system,

the presence of
ing)

As outlined earlier,

M

constellatory

constructs (as in stereotyp-

ff

or of "preemptive" constructs

the presence of certain others).

(one construct rules out

Also, one can look at the

"permeability," the "dilation/ constrict ion," or the "tight-

ness/looseness" of constructs
of various constructs.

,

and the "range of convenience"

These criteria have been explained in

45

greater detail above and their application
will be illustrated in the presentation of results.

While it is not the purpose of this study to embark
on
intensive individual analyses of 32 protocols, using

all of

Kelly's criteria, it does appear that many of his
criteria
help to guide our understanding and comparison of
some of the

construct systems.

Furthermore, some of his criteria, when

applied to these Rep tests, carry implications for how psy-

chologists may communicate with each other.

For instance, if

we made the judgment that most of the construct systems were

highly "impermeable," then we might conclude that psychologists have a hard time talking with one another.

If we found

that the construct systems were not cognitively complex, this

might have implications for the quality of the paradigm in

which psychologists operate.

However, it must be reiterated

that the application of Kelly's criteria is an educated and
yet sub j ect ive judgment, based on intensive interaction with
the data, both with individual protocols separately and with

many collectively.
To summarize the criteria on which these judgments are

based, there are four construct - types which delineate the
focus

,

orientat ion

,

or content of constructs in the sample:

1.

constructs which focus directly on some view of
people and behavior; Type I; e.g., "internal/
external control of behavior."

2.

constructs which focus on how people and behavior are studied; Type II; e.g., "lab analog/
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directly observable."
3.

constructs which are descriptive of the concepts themselves; Type III; e.g., "molar/
molecular."

4.

constructs which are nomative in nature; Type
IV; e.g., "biological/social."

There are seven related criteria provided by Kelly which
are useful in assessing the quality of constructs and con-

struct systems:

1.

cognitive complexity defined by Bieri et_ al.
(1961) as involving both "differentiation Tnumber of different dimensions underlying a construct system) and articulation (extent of discriminations made within a dimension)" (in Wiggins, p. 490).
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder
(1961) note a concrete/abstract dimension as a
significant aspect of cognitive complexity.

2.

the degree to which constructs are constella tory
the presence of one construct implies
the presence of others, as in stereotyping.

,

:

Zj

the degree to which constructs are preemptive
the presence of one construct preempts the
presence of certain others

4.

the degree to which constructs and construct
their
systems are perme able or impermeable

:

:

flexibility in being open to new dimensions.
5.

the dilation / constrict ion of construct systems

(related to permeability).
6.

the tightness / looseness of construct systems
(related to 4 and 5)

7.

the range of convenience of various constructs:

indicates Eow widely applicable a construct is
to the set of stimulus items.
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Data Explication

Case Examples

:

In applying these criteria, consider the
following con

struct protocols:
CASE

I

(f aculty,

clinical

CASE II

)

reductionis tic/ expansive
flexible/rigid
cognitive/ affective

(student, clinical!

isolated/ integrated
dynamic/static
structure and process/pure process
cognitive/emotional
need for others/self -sufficiency
simpl is tic/ complex
inter actional/ self -perpetuating
ascribed characteristics/situational assessment
singular perspective/multiple
perspective
relational/ intellectual
change -oriented/ immutable
internally directed/externally
directed
simultaneity/ evolutional
single focus/integrated
intrapsychic/ relational

concrete/ abstract
complex/ simplistic

.

predictable/unpredictable
quantitative/qualitative
structured/unstructured
theoretical/ empirical
other- oriented/ self- oriented
potentiality/ restriction
closed/ open- ended

cumulative/ integrative
rational /irrational
defined/ undefined

These first two cases show the raw data in the order in which
they were obtained. Each bipolar construct was generated from

comparison of three concepts.

While the concepts used in

each case were different, many of them are similar or related.

Nevertheless, two very different profiles emerge.

In looking first at Case I, note that at least seven of

the fifteen constructs can be grouped together, or subsumed

under one major construct.
expansive, closed/open- ended

These include:
,

reductionis tic/

structured/unstructured, de-

fined/undefined, restriction/potentiality, and perhaps pre-

a
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dictable/unpredictable.

All these constructs can be logic-

ally subsumed under the heading of
restriction/potentiality.

Other constructs in the protocol can also
be linked.
instance, the dimensions "quantitative/qualitative"

pirical/theoretical" seemed connected.

For
and "em-

Also, one could clus-

ter "concrete/abstract" and "simplistic/complex**
together.

Notice that there are three constructs which are more
directly about people:

rational/irrational, cognitive/affective,

and other-oriented/self-oriented.

Finally, there remains the

construct "cumulative/integrative" which could be judged as
the most cognitively complex and abstract construct in the

protocol (see criteria for complexity) and also as one which
stands on its own.

In applying our criteria, we might con-

clude that this is not

a

particularly complex protocol, main-

ly because there is one overriding constellation of con-

structs, namely the seven constructs noted above.

Parts of

this person's system seem permeable in that some constructs
are not tightly connected to other constructs, while the con-

stellatory part seems rather tight and impermeable.
Case
structs.

I

is noteworthy in its absence of many Type

Rather, there is a preponderance of Type

Type III constructs.

con-

I

II

and

However, from this case one can see the

difficulty in making definitive categori zations of constructs
What is interesting in this case is that one cannot distinguish between constructs which describe people and those

which describe methodology.

For instance, the theme of

M

po-
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tentiality/restriction" seems applied to both research and to

behavior

Now consider Case II.
system is quite different.

The character of this construct

While some of the constructs seem

related, few can be logically subsumed under others.
stance, even

"

For in-

intrapsychic/relational" and "relational/ intel-

lectual" do not refer to the same areas of human experience.

Only "isolated/integrated," "singular perspective/multiple

perspective" and "single focus/ integrated" are similar or
convergent.

Using the definitions (see criteria above) of

cognitive complexity provided by Bieri and by Harvey, Hunt,
and Schroder, this is
a

a

very complex system.

Note also that

majority of the constructs are directly about people and

behavior (Type

I).

This system is seen to be quite permea-

ble, quite ready to absorb and integrate new dimensions.

This judgment is made because there is only one minor con-

stellation of constructs and no constructs which might preempt the presence of others.

Now consider two more construct systems.
CASE III

(faculty, clinical)

interpretative/ stabl
internal/ external
externally appli ed/ internal
ly applied
controlling/uncontrolled

non-specific/ specific
verbally mediated/under no
controlling influence
global/ specific

CASE IV (faculty, clinical)

qualitative/ quantitative
uniqueness /normative
cognitive/behavioral
relationship- centered/ ob j ectcentered
holistic/atomistic
time -oriented/pre sent -oriented

qualitative/quantitative
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systematic/variable
orderly/ sporadic
variable system/established
system
measureable/not measureable
external/internal control
interpretive/ st able
lack of control/control
occurring in interactive
fashion/occurring in isolated fashion

predictive/descriptive
theory/practice
content -oriented/structureoriented
present -oriented/past- oriented
external/internal determinants
mot i vat ional/des crip tive
holistic/atomistic
change -oriented/understandingoriented

In Case III, many of the constructs are related to each

other.

One large constellation consists of:

interpretive/

stable, variable/systematic, sporadic/orderly, non-specific/

specific, not measureable/measureable

cluster (constellation)

,

perhaps really

first cluster, consists of:

control/control
diated.

,

,

and so on.
a

A second

variant of the

uncontrolled/ controlled, lack of

under no controlling influence/verbally me-

A third closely related cluster centers around in-

ternal/external control.

Only the dimension "interactive/

isolated" breaks out of the closely tied constellations.
appears that only
chologist:

a

It

few dimensions are salient for this psy-

control and order, either internal or external.

This is an excellent example of a very tight, constricted,

impermeable construct system.

In this case,

it appears that

these factors preempt the incorporation of other- kinds of

constructs, mainly because of the tightness of the constellations.

Again, one should note the lack of clarity as to whe-

ther constructs apply to people or methodology.

would seem here that the focus

is

In fact,

so sharp and delineated

it
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that constructs would apply to both areas.
is

hard to decide if these are Type

I

Hence, while it

or Type II constructs,

this lack of differentiation between constructs about people

and those about methodology may have interesting implications, paradigmatically speaking.

Case IV presents yet another interesting profile.

While

this is a fairly well - integrated and organized system (pro-

bably more so than Case II), it is still quite complex, compared to Cases
its complexity)

I

and III.

It seems less permeable

(despite

than Case II, in that in Case IV, there al-

most seem to be boundaries around the person's thinking.
Within the system, there is far more room to entertain ideas
than in Case III, and yet it still appears more "set in its

ways" than Case II.

Case IV also -illustrates a rather clear

integration of both people-oriented and method-oriented dimensions.

In this protocol,

it appears that the person has

more clearly delineated which constructs are research-based
and which are people-based

(e.g., "qualitative/quantitative")

("past-oriented/present-oriented")

There are also

.

of different construct - types in this profile,

preponderance of just one type,

as

in Case VI.

a

number

rather than

a

There seems

to be a grasp of both an understanding of people and of con-

cepts, and it is possible to sort out dimensions about people

from dimensions about concepts.

One interesting and somewhat

idiosyncratic twist in this protocol
dimension.

When this

is

is

an emphasis on a time

compared to Case I's emphasis on po-
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tentiality/restriction, one can observe just how individualistic the protocols are.

One should also note that the Rep

test is sensitive enough as an instrument to pick up
these

important differences in thought systems.
lustrates

a

Hence, Case IV il-

cognitively complex system which is somewhat im-

permeable
CASE V (student, clinical )

dynamic/static
explanatory/post hoc
focus of cause/effect
focus on understanding/focus on behavior
behavior as modifiable/predetermined
internal influence/external influence
behavior as quantifiable, measureable/quali tative
explanatory/ category
non-restrictive (free) /reality constraints
individual focus/across people
inter actional /intrapersonal
current focus/historical
internal motivation for behavior/external
public, observable reality/private, unobservable reality
people capable of responding to public reality/people not always capable of responding to public reality
In comparison, Case V shows a rather complex and people-

centered construct system, with

a

special emphasis on the ex-

tent to which "reality" constrains behavior.

It should be

noted that this focus remains people- centered and not methodology-centered.

While there are Type

II

and Type III con-

structs, much of the focus still remains toward people.
focus in this case is, in
I

a

The

way, related to the focus in Case

on potentiality/restriction and to the focus in Case II to

order and control, but in Case V, this theme is closely tied
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to an understanding of people.

Whatever the similarities,

however, the nuances and inuendoes which differentiate
con-

struct systems from each other are clearly very important.
It should become evident by this point that if
more than two

systems are compared at one time, the richness of the inter-

play within

a

protocol is lost, particularly if the protocols

are complex.

Compare Case V to Case VI:
CASE VI

(student, non-clinical )

empirical/hypothetical
reductionis tic/holistic
methodological/ theoretical
specific/ambiguous
deductive/ inductive
narrow/broad
reductionist ic/hol is tic
theoretical/methodological
holistic inductive/ reductionis tic
empirical/ theoretical
reductionis tic/holistic
external/ internal
realistic/ idealistic
specific/broad
obj ective/sub j ective
,

Notice that in Case VI, there is hardly

definitively about people.
and III.

Clearly,

a

construct which is

Almost all constructs are Type II

this person viewed the concepts either

evaluatively (Type III) or in terms of where they came from
(Type II).

The difference between the thinking in Case VI

compared to Case V is so tremendous, that it would be doubtful that these two people would have much in common in their

orientations as psychologists.

In Case VI,

it

is not even
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obvious that the person is a psychologist and not

a

biologist.

Case VI is a fairly simple and cohesive construct system
with
a few

highly related constellations of constructs.

For in-

stance, reductionistic/holistic is used four times, is similar to narrow/broad, and may be .related to specific/broad.

Another constellation, which seems related to the first constellation, includes constructs like:
al, methodological/theoretical,

empirical/hypothetic-

and deductive/ inductive

These constellations are good examples of Type
CASE VII

II

constructs.

(student, non-clinical )

internal process of causation/ contextual causation
finite variables/infinite number of variables
theory as approximation/ theory as explanation
person as controller/person as victim
combinatory process/singular process
holistic/linear
complex/mechanistic
intuition as part of systematic thinking/intuition not part
of systematic thinking
hereditary /con textual
behavior as predictable/unpredictable
dynamic/non- dynamic
finite causali ty/ infinite causality (anarchy)
molecular/multiple wholes
linear /nonlinear
simple/complex
Case VII is also a good example of

Type

II

a

predominance of

constructs, i.e., how people and behavior are studied.

In this case,

there is a preoccupation with the approach the

researcher takes toward his/her work.

In interviewing this

respondent after the task was completed, he told me that his

primary concern was the "presumptuousness" of the researcher.
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There are comparatively few (cf., Cases V and
IV) constructs
directly about people and behavior. Nevertheless,
Case VII

presents

thoughtful and rich set of constructs.

a

highly abstract and show

a

informs this person's work.

complicated thought process which
While the emphasis is once re-

moved from people, this constitutes
system.

They are

a

complex and organized

This person's cognitive complexity is devoted to

thinking about research rather than people.

While both Case

VII and Case VI are oriented toward how people and behavior
are studied (Type II), the constructs in Case VII are them-

selves more abstract and more varied, thus making the total

construct system more cognitively complex than Case VI.
CASE VIII

(faculty, non-clinical )

psychological process/ theoretical approach
methodological/ theoretical
molecular/molar
p er s on- oriented/non- per son -oriented
molecular /molar
non- scientific/ scientific
non- cognitive/ cognitive
psychological/ s tat is tical
cognitive/behavioral
theoretical/ empirical
behavioral/cogni t ive
scientific/mystical
theoretical/ empirical
cognitive/physiological behavioral
cognitive, comparative process/non- comparative
,

Compare Case VII to Case VIII.

In Case VIII,

preponderance of cons truct- types II, III, and IV.
a

there is a

There are

number of nomative constructs and evaluative-descriptive

constructs.

Note that there are relatively few dimensions
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about people, as compared to Cases II, IV, and V.

Again, the

focus here is on where the concepts originate (e.g., empiric-

al/hypothetical) rather than on what the concepts imply about
people.

This is a fairly well- integrated system in that the

constructs seem related, but it is neither particularly com*

plex nor permeable.

Nevertheless, complexity must be judged in relation to
other protocols.

Compared to Case IX, Case VIII is quite

complex.
CASE IX (faculty, clinical )

internal/ external
idio graphic/normative
focus on parts/whole
focus on differences/ central tendency
behavior controlled by current environment/past events
internal/ external regulation
focus on normal/disordered behavior
idiographic/normative
internal/ external control
focus Dn disordered behavior/ordered behavior
external/ internal control
external/ internal control
purely environmental regulation/per son- environment interaction
behavior controlled by past events/controlled by current environment
external/ internal control

Essentially, Case IX has only three constructs:

normative

,

internal/ external control

,

idiographic/

and normal/ disordered

This illustrates an unusually simple and unsophisticated system.

Notice the vast difference between the cognitive com-

plexity of the thinking in Case

II

compared to Case IX.

Hence, using the criteria of complexity, it is interesting to
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compare Cases
II 's

II

and IX.

Yet, it should be noted that Case

constructs are almost all Type

to Cases VI or VII.

I

constructs, as compared

It becomes increasingly clear, as we

proceed in this explication, that it
all the protocols on all criteria.

is

impossible to compare

Some criteria are espe-

cially prominent in certain protocols and are best illus-

trated in relation to other protocols which have different
foci and different qualities.

It also becomes obvious through

this analysis that there is tremendous variation within and

between protocols.
CASE X (student, non- clinical )

individual as active/passive
theoretical /empirical
theoretical/ empirical
theoretical explanation/practical -change focus
individual/ group
broad/narrow
process -oriented/ structure -oriented
theoretical/ empirical
specific/ general
hypothetical, inferred/observed, measureable
passive/active
individual as trying to predict/ individual as trying to understand
methodological/ theoretical
particular is tic/universal is tic
Case X demonstrates

a

mixture of all the construct- types

with an emphasis on the methodological.

Here again there is

some blurring between constructs about people and those about

how people are to be studied.

For instance, while the con-

struct "individual as trying to predict/understand"
ly about people,

is

clear-

it is very similar to other dimensions which

58

focus on the predictive and theoretical elements in concepts.
The implications of this merging of the way one sees people

and does research will be discussed later.

Case X also shows the redundancy of many constructs.

As

noted earlier, respondents were usually reluctant to repeat

themselves and hence often gave synonymous constructs.

In

Case X, the total fifteen constructs can be summarized in
just a few constructs:

theoretical/empirical, passive/ active

specific/general, etc.

When constructs are repeated in this

way, one can surmise that the cognitive field of the person
is

heavily influenced by the few constellations.

This,

in

itself, is probably preemptive and must serve to constrict
the overall thought system.

CASE XI

(faculty, non- clinical )

fixed/plastic
mental., structure/personality structure
internal /external
dynamic/ static
cognitive (internal events) /behavioral (external)
internal/ external
explanatory/ descriptive
dynamic/ stat ic
external (behavioris tic) /internal (cognitive)
dynamic/ static
internal/ external
explanatory /descriptive
explanatory/ descriptive
state (factual events) /trait
explanatory (interpretive) /descriptive

Another example of
plexity)

is Case XI.

subsume the rest:

a

limited cognitive field (low com-

Here again, four or five dimensions can

cognitive/behavioral, internal/external

59

dynamic/static, explanatory/descriptive.

In this case,

the

person makes it clear that two salient dimensions are constellatory:
CASE XII

cognitive/behavioral and internal/external.

(faculty, non-clinical )

multiple focus/single focus
cultural determinants/innate determinants
environmental/ intra- individual
implicit bias/empty organism
internal/external focus
global/ narrow
collaborative research/subjects (Ss) as objects
dialectical/ linear
focus on parts/whole
mul tidimens ional/uni dimensional
person in environments/no interaction between individual and
environment
acceptance of value and belief systems in Ss/denial of value
or belief systems in Ss
interdisciplinary/single frame
physical/ socio cultural
atomistic/holistic
Finally, Case XII, like Case VII, focuses to some extent
on Type II constructs.

There is concern in this case,

(cf.,

Case VII) with how subjects in experiments are treated.

There is also an emphasis on how multidimensional the re-

searcher's orientation is.

Case XII is complex and rather

well- integrated, with a focus on the complexities of

people.
ences,

s

tudying

Again, in noting the richness of individual differ-

the focus in Case XII on the interdisciplinary per-

spective, as

a

part of being multidimensional, is completely

different from the focus on "reality constraints" in Case V.
In summary,

then,

it becomes clear through this presen-

tation that individual differences in one's approach to the

60

task and in the construct systems generated from
it, are

enormous and enlightening.

These differences also make ob-

vious why the data are depleted of their depth when
compiled

"across" people.

Indeed,

the shades of meaning in a protocol

are only meaningful within the total Gestalt of the individual

profile.

Nevertheless, we are able to apply the sets of cri-

teria, in an effort to ferret out the kinds of differences

which are present.

Some criteria are more pertinent in cer-

tain cases, but the criteria are generally useful in making

distinctions between protocols and will be especially helpful
in making interpretations from the data.

The four construct-

types, while not always distinguishable, do help in viewing

overall areas of concern in the data.
Finally, it should be noted that these twelve profiles

were chosen for

a

variety of reasons.

They represent a

cross- section of the kinds of data obtained.
of respondents in the sample are represented.

All four groups

Different le-

vels of cognitive complexity are shown, as well as different

kinds of construct- types

.

Some of the cases used were chosen

because they are reasonably typical (given individual differences) of parts of the total sample, and some because they
are exemplary of the various criteria.

Results:

Trends and Themes

In light of the qualitative nature of the data,

it would

be both reductionis tic and inaccurate to report definitive
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results.

Rather, we can enunciate various trends and
themes

which stand out from the protocols and the total
sample.
These trends are interpretative, as opposed to
definitive,

because the idiographic nature of the data necessarily leads
to the presence of exceptions to every statement
made and

every trend reported.
The lack of def ini tiveness in the data became even more

evident in an attempt to investigate more quantitatively the

possibility of discernible differences between various groups
of respondents.

A sorting task was arranged, in which two

people who had been in the study were asked to sort 32 cards

with the 32 construct systems into four piles- -clinical students, clinical faculty, non-clinical students, non-clinical

faculty.

Neither respondent was able to distinguish between

faculty and students. Both respondents were able to distinguish between clinicians and non- clinicians to some extent.
One respondent got 20 out of 32 correctly sorted (62.5%),

while the other got 22 out of 32 correct (68%)

goodness-

.

of-fit tests on the two sorters' preformances proved nonsignificant.
a

Statistical significance would have mandated

performance of 24 out of 32 or 75% correct in sorting.
Despite the inability for respondents to figure out

differences between clinicians and non- clinicians

,

it is

possible, using the criteria set forth earlier, to see differences between the various sub-groups.

Hence, we will

first describe the trends which distinguish groups from each
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other and then move to

a

report of some general trends over

almost all respondents.

Between students and faculty, the following trends can
be observed.

First, faculty constructs tend to contain

shorter, more terse phrases to articulate dimensions.

Stu-

dents, on the contrary, often use longer phrases in their

constructs.

Second, while faculty constructs tend to be less

permeable and less cognitively complex and rich than students, they tend to be better organized than students'.

Pro-

bably the brevity of the words used in dimensions is related
to this overall economy in faculty construct systems.

Stu-

dent construct systems, with some exceptions, tend to be more

cognitively complex, richer, more permeable, but less well
integrated.

Student construct systems are considered com-

plex given Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder's notion of

abstract dimension in complex constructs.

a

concrete/

Perhaps this is

reflected in the longer, more wordy constructs given by students.

Bieri's criterion of differentiation (number of di-

mensions) is also evident in many student cases which are
complex.

Bieri's criterion of articulation (extent of dis-

criminations made within
these protocols as

a

a

dimension) is less obvious in

determinant of complexity, although it

can be noted to some extent in cognitively complex protocols.

Finally, there is no obvious trend in the types of constructs

used which help distinguish students from faculty.
Between clinicians and non- clinicians in the sample, the
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following trends appear.
Type

I

In general,

clinicians employ more

constructs, while non- clinicians use more Type

structs.

con-

II

The general tone of many of the construct systems

illustrates or at least suggests these differences.

One can

find no highly integrated, cognitive
ly complex construct systerns

which are Type

II

in focus in the clinical group.

most complex systems among clinicians are heavily Type
orientation.

The
I

in

Likewise, one is hardpressed to find highly

complex, Type I-oriented construct systems in the non-clini-

cian group.

Hence, when there is complexity in a clinician's

protocol, its focus is likely to be directly related to notions about people and behavior.
a

When there is complexity in

non-clinician's construct system, its focus

on how people and behavior are studied.

is

likely to be

In addition,

it

should be noted that there are no discernible differences between groups in the employment of Type III and Type IV constructs

.

To some extent, it appears that the first set of cri-

teria (construct types)

,

which deal with the focus of the

constructs, helps delineate between clinicians and non-clinicians but not students and faculty, whereas the second set
of criteria, from Kelly, which deal with the quality of con-

structs and construct systems, helps differentiate more between students and faculty.

Thus, the overall trends suggest

that students show greater complexity and permeability but
less organization.

Faculty, on the other hand, show tenden-
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cies toward fewer constructs which are better
organized, of-

ten at the expense of both complexity and permeability.
In looking at the total sample, many of the individual

differences which enrich the data become muted.

However,

there are themes in the total sample which emerge through

interaction with the data.

In pointing out these themes, it

may be helpful to again rely on the construct types.

Type

I

Within

constructs, the most salient dimension to emerge is

"internal/external control of or motivation for behavior."
This construct, or variations on it, is the commonest throughout the sample, within this construct- type

.

Within Type

II

constructs, the clearest theme about how people and behavior
are studied derives from dimensions like "empirical/hypothe-

tical," "inferred/observed" and so on.

These dimensions are

actually correlates of the internal/external control dimension in Type

I

constructs, in that they tap into whether re-

search is controlled or uncontrolled, public or private, tangible or intangible, or definitive or ambiguous.

Within the third construct- type (descriptive)
themes can be noted.

,

a

few

These reflect dimensions like "molar/

molecular," "global/specific," "holistic/atomistic," "reductionist ic/expans ive

,"

and "knowledge -oriented/ act ion- oriented"

or "theoretical/applied."
to each other,

The first two themes seem related

in that what is molecular might also be re-

ductionistic and what

is

molar might also be expansive.

The

last theme noted is a major factor in distinguishing between
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clinicians and non- clinicians in general.

The distinction

between concepts that advance theory and those which
have
more practical application seems important in the sample.

a

The fact that many concepts can be contrasted on the
basis
of this distinction may suggest that there is some mutual
ex-

clusivity between applied and theoretical notions in the
field.

Finally, no particular themes emerge from the fourth

construct- type, i.e., nomative dimensions.
In general,

though, the themes which emerge center

around the degree of control the individual has over his/her

behavior and the degree of control the researcher has over
his/her research.

There seems to be some merging or fusing

of these two seemingly interrelated themes, in that it is

often hard to know if constructs refer directly to people and

behavior or to how people and behavior are to be studied.
This relationship, as well as its relationship to themes from

construct- type III, will be explored below.
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CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
In interpreting the trends enumerated above, and
in dis-

cussing the overall implications of this study, the data and
the entire research process need to be understood within a

number of frameworks.

First, we need to evaluate the modifi-

cation of Kelly's Rep test employed in this research.

Second,

we need to examine the fruitfulness of this methodology in

helping to elucidate psychology's paradigm.

Third, we need

to interpret the trends reported, given Kuhn's notions of

paradigms.

In addition, we should compare these findings to

the dimensions reported by Coan (1968).

Fifth, we must inter-

pret the findings within the broader context of
slant on the sociology of knowledge.

a

Marxist

Finally, we need to as-

sess the usefulness of this kind of highly abstract and ex-

ploratory research.
In determining the utility of the instrument employed in

this study, in helping to shed light on psychology's paradigm, it is first important to point out that the notion of

"paradigm" is itself
concept.

a

highly abstract and perhaps intangible

According to Kuhn (1962), one can provide words

which reflect the paradigm, but essentially, the operational
components of paradigms are to be found in the kind of equipment and methodology used or through the "anomalies" which
disturb paradigms.

Kuhn would probably agree that it is dif-
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ficult to ask scientists to articulate their paradigm,
except in retrospect.

Of course, the methodology used here was

an attempt to go into people's thinking through a kind
of

back door, so to speak, by asking for their constructs.
was hopefully

a

This

reasonable choice of method for this problem,
m

given the abstract and the "taken- for- granted" nature of

paradigms
This approach to uncovering psychology's paradigm pro-

vides us with important information on very salient and un-

doubtably heated issues in the field today.
lacks in def init iveness

esting and provocative.

,

What the study

it compensates for by being inter-

Perhaps it is

a

necessary first step

in understanding ourselves in this field, to begin to docu-

ment the concerns which are so apparent in daily interaction

with psychologists.

Hence, in elucidating critical dimen-

sions, even if these findings come from an interpretative and
not "conclusive" process, we are still in a better position
to evaluate ourselves and our work.

As an initial step in this process, we need to evaluate

the modification of Kellian theory and method employed here.

From the research process described above, we must conclude
that the Rep test is indeed an idiographic tool.

The bipolar

constructs are most readily understood within their own contexts.

Even though the same words may be used by different

people, the ways in which one construct is related to another

depends upon its position within its total Gestalt.

This
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critical factor unfortunately limited some of the
highly

nomothetic analyses intended in the study.
dubious that the assumption that "what
to an individual,

a

a

It also makes

construct system is

paradigm is to the field" is anything

more than hypothetically plausible.

Indeed, not only is the

whole not equal to the sum of its parts, but its parts cannot
be summed or multiplied or divided in any reasonable way.

Nevertheless, the individual explication and eventual integrative process did provide

a

lot of rich information.

It

should also be noted that while Kelly and his followers never tried to consolidate constructs across people, they have

engaged in

a

process analogous to what was done here.

In

other words, while Kellians only evaluate one Rep test at
time,

a

they have looked at various similarities and differ-

ences between different diagnostic groups, different age

groups, and the like.

Approaching Rep tests in this way is

complicated because they are essentially individual measures,
and yet revealing because characteristics can only be seen

through this comparative process.
In further evaluating the method,

necessary again

it is

The variation of

to comment on the abstractness of the task.

Kelly used here was so abstract that even the stimulus items

were abstractions.

This meant that the constructs were ab-

stractions on abstractions, or meta- concepts

.

However chal-

lenging intellectually, there are drawbacks to collecting and
making sense of data of this nature.

While it is unclear
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that paradigmatic notions could be investigated more simply,
the abstruse nature of this technique leaves something to be

desired.

The problems in the logic of comparing concepts,

which several respondents articulately pointed out, also detract from the advisability of this approach.
Kelly's method is both tempting and misleading in certain ways.

The technique is so economical in the discrete

sort of data generated, that many variations of the original
Rep test present themselves as possibilities in research.

Indeed, it is inviting to consider the many kinds of con-

struct systems one could design for different purposes.

The

simple elegance of substituting any set of stimulus items
and then supplying dimensions is appealing.

However, it ap-

pears that people have a hard time- articulating constructs

which guide their thinking.

Also, the constructs obtained

may only make sense within the very narrow set of stimulus
items.

Having used this instrument, my impression is that

the Rep test looks more applicable to a variety of problems

than it really is.

This instance suggests that the Rep test

loses both reliability and validity when its original purpose
is

changed and when it is extended across people.

Of course,

given the abstract nature of this study, it is unclear what
other method might have been used to supplement the Rep test.
In another study,

it would seem advisable to use the Rep test

in conjunction with other measures.

Given both the shortcomings and richness of the method

70

used here,

.let us

now interpret the trends and themes
report-

ed within the frameworks set forth
at the outset of the project.
Within Kuhn's framework, the trends
reported might

suggest that psychology is either
pre-paradigmatic or is in a
crisis state. This interpretation is
made because of the
high number of Type II constructs.
Kuhn might argue that the
.

preoccupation with how people and behavior
are studied indicates the beginning of a paradigm shift.
Indeed, there is

ample evidence, beyond this study, that this
may be the case.
Elms (1975) writes of a kind of identity or
paradigmatic crisis within social psychology.

The data in this study, which

suggest that more non- clinicians (mainly social psychologists)
are preoccupied with Type II constructs, are consistent with
Elms'

contention.

Buss

(1975)

also notes that the field has

been inundated with articles devoted to the "self -reflection"
ongoing in the field today.
II

Hence, the finding of many Type

constructs may illustrate the beginnings of

a

major reor-

ganization of psychology's paradigm.
Other related trends can be explained within both Kuhn's
and Kelly's frameworks.

For instance, the narrowness of peo-

ple's construct systems may be indicative of

mentation in the field.
(in Bannister,

a

profound frag-

One Kellian researcher, Adams-Webber

1970), describes this fragmentation as entail-

ing constructs which are overdif f erentiated but not inte-

grated.

This was evident in several of the individual con-

struct systems and perhaps in the sample as

a

whole.

The

71

highly idiosyncratic dimensions often
provided may imply a
fragmentation within the field as well as
within some indi-

.

viduals.

Adams-Webber sees this leading to "potential
chaos"
(schizophrenia, within an individual showing
this
on the ori-

ginal Rep test)

breakdown of

a

(cf.

James, 1975) or what Kuhn would call the

paradigm.

The overall lack of cognitive com-

plexity in the protocols may indicate an almost rigid
adherence to a few key dimensions.

Kuhn also notes that this

tends to happen once anomalies have upset

a

discipline.

Of

course, it should be pointed out that all these speculations

may be artifactual and may simply derive from qualities of
the task itself.

Nevertheless, assuming the task has some

validity, these are logical interpretations to make.
Kuhn's notions can be applied

-to

other trends as well.

One important impression is that faculty constructs were

shorter, more explicit and more terse, and less permeable
than student constructs.

Kuhn posits that as scientists be-

come increasingly embedded in their scientific communities
and in existing modes of thought, their vantage points and

assumptions become more inflexible.
in this study.
to

This idea was reflected

Socialization into the field seems to lead

rigidif ication of dimensions in one's work and outlook.
Kuhn notes that

who share

a

paradigm"

a

"scientific community consists of men
(p.

176).

Maybe the individualistic

and often idiosyncratic nature of the data implies that we
are not much of a community

.

Indeed, the vast differences in
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modes of construing show

likely inability for many psycho-

a

logists to communicate effectively
and constructively with
each other (cf. Cases V and III
above).
Kuhn goes on to say
that "a paradigm governs.
.not a subject matter, but rather
a group of practitioners"
(p. 18.0).
If this
.

be the case,

then this study addresses itself to
the right population.
From the trends reported, though, it
might be argued that
people have rather idiosyncratic, mini
-paradigms to govern

themselves and yet alienate them from potential
colleagues.
This contention is consonant with Bannister's
(1970) critique that psychology is comprised of many
"psychologies"

rather than some unified system of thought.
Indeed, while it was possible to glean certain con-

struct- types from the data, there are many combinations and

permutations of how these types could be arranged.

Either

there is a paradigm which individuals internalize or use differently, or there is considerable fragmentation and discord
in the way psychologists work.

This suggests the existence

of a paradigmatic crisis in the field today.

Further, the finding of both highly idiosyncratic constructs, juxtaposed with the finding of common themes (around
control) through many of the protocols, seems contradictory.

How can

a

field be simultaneously pre-paradigmatic (highly

individualized) and yet have common themes which seem para-

digmatic?

It is argued here that this apparent paradox un-

ravels if we look at these findings as representing different
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levels of meaning within thought systems.

The uniformity

represented in the theme of "control" is based on

a

more ab-

stract level of analysis and relies on the
interpretive

framework of this study.
•

Given this, it seems that psychology, as

illustrates either
uniformity, or

a

a

a

discipline,

manifest fragmentation covering

manifest uniformity covering

latent fragmentation.

a

a

a

latent

more basic or

If it is the case that the field has

manifest fragmentation which covers a more basic uniform-

ity,

then it could be said that the field functions pluralis-

tically within

a

paradigm, or that the existing paradigm is

beginning to break down.

On the other hand, if the situation

is actually that there exists a manifest uniformity which

covers a latent or more fundamental fragmentation, then one

might argue that psychology is perhaps

"

pseudoparadigmat ic "

rather than pre-paradigmatic or paradigmatic.

This suggests

that in the absence of a set of fundamentally shared meanings,
the field constructs a set of shared conventions or "opera-

tional definitions" upon which

a

"reality" about people and

behavior is then constructed and developed.
scientists could agree on

a

hypothetical set of definitions,

even if absurd, and then proceed

resented both

a

A community of

as_

if these definitions rep-

deeper set of shared meanings as well as an

accurate reflection of "the real world."

Anthropomorphically

speaking, the notion of a "pseudoparadigm" is akin to Vai-

hinger's concept of the "as if" personality (in Szasz, 1961,
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p.

Perhaps one could posit the analogy that what the

245).

notion of "as if" is to the individual personality,
the "pseudoparadigm" is to the field.

The salient dimensions found in this study also need
to
be compared to the previous work in this area.

The constructs

which stand out in this study are very close to those obtained
by Coan (1968) and enumerated earlier in the thesis.

Indeed,

Coan's central theme of "fluidity/restriction" corresponds to
an emphasis in many of the protocols on "potentiality/restric-

tion."

While all of his dicotomies emerge in this study,

there is a far greater emphasis in this work on what Coan
calls the "endogenous/exogenous" dimension.
is

a

key trend in this study.

This dimension

Nevertheless, Coan's dimen-

sions pretty well cover the common constructs in my total
sample.

This corroboration of findings is encouraging and

lends credibility to the validity of this thesis, especially
in light of the qualitative orientation of this work in com-

parison to Coan's elegant statistical analysis.
However, while Coan's work addresses important dicotomies

underlying theorists, there is an absence of focus on the substantive concerns in the field.

The present study has fo-

cused on content issues and has noted at least one crucial
content area in the field today.

This trend concerns the fo-

cus on issues of "control" found in the Type

the data.

I

constructs in

In explaining and interpreting this important
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theme, we now move to the Marxist slant on
the sociology of

knowledge enunciated earlier.

Assuming that these trends are reliable and valid, we
need to account for the fact that psychologists have constructs about control at the root of their thinking.

It is

almost as if the popular social learning theory notion of
"locus of control" is itself

a

meta-concept which comes into

play in numerous areas in psychologists' work.

We noted ear-

lier that there was often a fusing or merging of Type

I

and

Type II constructs, that is, constructs about people and constructs about how people should be studied.

This merging is

reflected in the presence of "locus of control" as

a

salient

dimension upon which concepts themselves are designed and
understood.

In other words,

it is .popular in the field today

to apply locus of control notions to understanding people and

behavior, as well as research.

From this study, it also

seems popular today to invent and organize concepts themselves
on the basis of this control construct.

One seemingly appealing explanation of why psychologists

have constructs about control at the root of their thinking
is that issues of "free-will versus determinism" are funda-

mental philosophical issues which lie at the basis of the
field.

And yet, this explanation does not take us very far,

simply because many other philosophical dimensions, also

deeply rooted in psychology, do not emerge as salient from
the data.

For instance, issues of whether human beings are

76

"good or evil" are also fundamental to the
philosophical un-

derpinnings of psychology but do not emerge from the
data.
Thus, there seems to be something current about
psychology's
focus, on control.

Indeed, Coan (1962) notes an historical

trend in the field over the last eighty years from

a

focus

on endogenous theories to exogenous theories.

Within the sociology of knowledge framework articulated
here, we need to understand the preoccupation with control as

growing out of our society, as being
times."

a

kind of "sign of the

Within the Marxist framework developed here, we need

to understand this control focus as in some way exemplifying
the portrayal of human beings and their conditions within a

highly impersonal, technological, oppressive, capitalist society.

Indeed, given the Marxist position, we need to look

at the concepts psychologists invent as the products which

they produce and distribute to the society.

The means by

which these products are produced, i.e., the laboratory and
so on,

should tell us something about the view psychology has

of people.

These means should also tell us something about

the culture and psychology's participation in its perpetuation.

Further, the merging of concepts about people and

those about how people are studied (the means by which psy-

chology produces ideas) is consonant with the fundamental

Marxist notion that the means of production determines modes
of rel ation (Fromm, 1962).

Psychology's preoccupation with issues of control, as
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seen in this study, is to be understood
as a testimony to

people's actual lack of control over both the
antecedents and
consequences of their behavior.
Further, within this
light,

the focus on control is understood as evidence
of our actual

alienation.

In a classic paper on the meaning of alienation,

Melvin Seeman (1959) notes that the commonest definition
of
alienation

is

powerlessness

.

Seeman defines powerlessness as

"the expectancy or probability held by the individual that
his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the out-

comes or reinforcements he seeks"

(p.

383).

Seeman goes on

to say that "the use of powerlessness as an expectancy means

that this version of alienation is very closely related to
the notion

(developed by Rotter) of 'internal versus external

control of reinforcements'

The congruence in these

formulations leaves the way open for the development of

a

closer bond between the two languages of analysis--that of

learning theory and that of alienation"
Rotter, Seeman,
Seeman'

s

(p.

384-385)

(cf.

Liverant 1962)

$

,

point is exceedingly important in light of the

present analysis.

2

It is contended here that locus of con-

trol, as a concept or meta-concept

,

is not

typically related

to notions of alienation and is not seen as arising out of an

actual state of alienation, because psychology as
is

blind to this insight.

Psychology

is

a

discipline

so flagrantly cut off

precisely because its products, or concepts, serve to reinforce the dominant structure of the culture and to thus pla-
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cate and mystify people.

Thus psychology becomes preoccupied

with whether the control of behavior is
internal or external
in lieu of addressing the more basic and
real experience of
an increasing lack of control.

then do experiments

Furthermore, psychologists

(the breeding place for concepts)

in pre-

arranged, stultified situations which supposedly
simulate

a

high degree of control, but which then produce and
distribute
notions to

a

non- laboratory world in which there is little

control

Within the Marxist context, control and alienation are
closely linked, experientially

,

and hence conceptually.

chology serves to obscure this connection.

Psy-

As psychologists

who function as appendages of the dominant superstructure, we

market concepts like "locus of control" (and

a

host of others

with control at their base) in order for people to think
themselves in control of their behavior.

Behaviorists even

fragment behavior into tiny particles in order to insure

people's sense of "self-control."

Indeed, why would this

field have such an obsession with control if not to create
and market concepts which facilitate

a

cultural construction

of behavior (a "social construction of reality")

in terms of

having or not having control?
In another culture, we might find that a salient dimen-

sion might deal with the extent to which the individual is in

communion with the Almighty.

And as psychologists, our task

would be to understand and develop the phenomena which help
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or hinder this communion process.

Such phenomena might tap

into concepts such as "sinfulness," "possession by
the de-

vil," and so on.

We might construct scales to determine the

degree of possession by the devil, and we might exhort exorcism as

a

therapeutic solution.

.

Yet in our culture, we devote our energies to "locus of

control" scales and focus our therapeutic talents toward giving the individual control over him/herself, either through

certain reinforcement schedules or insight ("Where id is, ego
shall be").

In any event,

the field markets control concepts,

and it is argued here that this is because people really feel

very little control over their own destinies.

Berger and Luckmann point out that in the dialectical

process between the individual and. the society, social phe-

nomena are all constructions which take their place through

related processes of externalization

ternalization

.

,

ob j ect ivation

,

and in -

Indeed, concepts produced and marketed by

psychologists enter into and grow out of these processes.

In

other words, we supply concepts which are needed by the culture.

And then, to quote Berger and Luckmann, "the products

act back on the producer"

(p.

61).

When products are set

forth in the culture without recognition of this dialectic
such products become reified.

According to Berger and Luck-

mann, "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as
if they were things"

(p.

89).

In other words, we forget that

we have "authorship" over our products.

Indeed, "even while
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apprehending the world in reified terms, man continues
to

produce it.

That is, man is capable paradoxically of produc -

in& a reality that denies him"

(p.

89)

(underlining mine)

This is a major interpretation of the trends found in
this

study which has crucial implications for the field as

a

whole
As psychologists, we produce concepts about or based on

control, which paradoxically furthers our lack of control.
As psychologists, our preoccupation with what is really a

pseudo-issue obscures the underlying issue of our alienation,
that is, our ever- increasing lack of control.
ly,

Hypothetical-

if psychology were a revolutionary force and were posi-

tioned outside of the mainstream culture, it would be dealing

with precisely this underlying issue.

But psychology is it-

self an agent which reinforces and perpetuates the status quo
in the culture.

The interpretations articulated here suggest

ways in which psychology unwittingly abets in this perpetuation.

Hence, if the content of the field's paradigm is con-

stituted around notions of the control of behavior (or control of experiments)

,

then one can see the paradigm itself as

both oppressive and mystifying.

As long as we invent and

market concepts about control, when the real issue is alienation, we continue in our collusion with other appendages of
the dominant culture.
We continue to sell

a

false bill of goods to the public

through our focus on concepts which supposedly give people

a
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sense of control, rather than those which
might address people's sense of alienation and its sources in society,
rather
than in ourselves.

In actuality, people are increasingly

cut off from the antecedents of or motivations
for their be-

havior.

Rather than acknowledge this, psychology exacerbates

this problem in its increasing denial of private,
intangible

modes of experience which may have

termination of behavior.

a

lot to do with the de-

That which is public and which can

be more readily controlled becomes the focus of interest to

psychologists.

These foci are then marketed as authorita-

tively- arrived- at concepts, which in turn become reified as
real things which constitute experience.

As people interna-

lize these reified concepts, which are themselves mystifying,

they further their own alienation and mystification.

Clearly, this study does not "prove" the interpretations

offered here in any conventional way.

Nevertheless, the

study does show trends which lend themselves to this type of

analysis.

If we can accept the interpretations given here,

then we have accomplished one of the purposes of the study,

namely, to show how psychology serves to reinforce and per-

petuate the status quo

.

We have suggested that an overriding

conceptual concern within the field centers around the control of behavior,

We have tied this concern to the actual

sense of alienation or lack of control in human experience in
this society.

Finally, we have developed the position that

psychology participates in

a

dialectical process which ob-
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scures this, actual core of experience.
As a final statement, it is perhaps
appropriate to as-

sess the overall usefulness of this kind of
highly abstract

and exploratory research.

Despite a number of problems in

administering the Rep tests, in systematically evaluating
them, and in eliciting a formal paradigm, it is
"nevertheless

contended here that this has been
dertake.

a

valuable process to un-

Because there are an ever increasing set of doubts

in the field about how psychologists should operate,

very important for research of this type to be done.
sonant with this view, Buss (1975) advocates that

a

it

is

Con-

sub-area

within psychology, called the "sociology of psychological
knowledge", be established to legitimize exactly this sort of
self-exploration.

Little (1972) advocates self - ref lexivity

in models of research to increase the congruence between how

psychologists see themselves compared to how they see others.
Sanford (1970) also advises that careful self-survey is needed in the social sciences in order to gain some independence

from the larger political system.
This type of exploratory research is also important as
a

way of learning to create, develop, and explicate methodo-

logies

.

This is vital if psychology as

a

discipline is to

not become further alienated, itself, from the means by which
it

produces ideas

,

or products

.

Indeed

,

our tacit acceptance

of various statistical operations serves, within our own do-

main, to reify what are basically other social constructions-
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Therefore, research which views method (means)
as being at
least as important as findings (ends), is
exemplary of a less

alienated and potentially more humane approach to
knowledge
itself.

Hopefully, this research has been an effort in that

direction.
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FOOTNOTES
1

To make an analogy (which will either further
confuse

or potentially clarify),

let me use Rorschach terminology.

The difference between Type
ple)

I

constructs (directly about peo-

and constructs which are nomative (Type

is

IV)",

similar

to the difference in Rorschach determinants between
M re-

sponses and F responses

show
li

a

.

M responses, like Type

I

constructs,

taking-in of the stimuli, an integration of the stimu-

with "inner life," either emotional or intellectual, and

an ability to articulate these inner workings.

ular

F

Plain or pop-

responses, like Type IV constructs, illustrate

of inner working.

which show either
ization or perhaps

a

lack

Rather, both are fast, standard responses
lack of depth or a high degree of social-

a

a

high degree of def ensiveness

Continuing with this comparison of construct- types to

Rorschach determinants, perhaps we can understand the other
two construct- types in this way.

Type II constructs, those

which focus on how people and behavior are studied, contain
inner working with the stimuli but are intellectualized and

distant, much like

a

Vista responses on the Rorschach might
«

be.

The third type of construct, those which describe qual-

ities or properties of the concepts themselves, without dealing with the implication or meanings of the concepts, are

perhaps roughly analogous to Dd responses - -accurate and correct but rather uninf ormative or devoid of real substance.
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While these types of constructs, or these types
of Rorschach
responses, show some indication of the person's
dealing with
the stimuli, there is still less meaningful
production than
in an integrated M response.

Perhaps

I

am drawn to this Rorschach analogy because in

both the Rorschach and in this variation of the Rep test,
the

interpretator needs to employ some system which differentiates and organizes ways that different people approach and

relate to sets of unusual stimuli.
2

Seeman's definition of alienation is not offered as an

accurate or exhaustive definition of alienation.

A compre-

hensive exploration of notions of alienation are beyond the
scope of the thesis.

However, Seeman's view is presented be-

cause of its relevance to issues of control which are prevalent in the field of psychology today.
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APPENDIX.
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>

List of Concepts
1.

a concept that

is

useful to you in research you are do-

ing or would like to do:
2.

a concept that

is

central to the class you liked best in

graduate school:
3.

a

concept that is central to a course you would like to

teach:
4.

a

concept that is central to the course you liked least

in graduate school:
5.

a concept that is

currently popular (widely used) but

which is incompatible with your orientation:
6.

a

concept that is currently popular (widely used) but not

relevant or important to your work:
7.

a

concept you feel will become increasingly important and.

will influence the future direction of the field:

8.

a

concept you think is somewhat of

a

"fad" but which has

no real lasting value:
9.

a

concept that used to be highly regarded years ago but

which
10.

is not

given much credence now:

a concept you feel has

influenced the direction of the

f ield
:

11.

a

molar concept (theory) that you think best explains

and understands people and their behavior:

93
a

molar concept (theory) that you think inadequately ex-

plains people and their behavior:
a

concept you feel has practical or applied value in

creating change in people or systems:
a

concept that describes your methodological orientations:

a

concept that has influenced you personally:

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
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List of Sorts
I.

6.
7.
9.

currently popular but irrelevant to your work
will influence direction of the field
used to be popular but not given credence now

II.

1.
4.

useful in your research
worst course in graduate school
influenced your personally

15.

III.

3.

13.

14.
IV.

4.
8.

10.

V.

7.
8.

10.

VI.

1.
6.

12.

VII.

3.

10.
11.

VIII.

2.
4.

14.

IX.

8.
9.

14.
X.

2.

11.
15.

XI.

1.
5.

14.

central to course you would like to teach
has practical or applied va ue in creating change
in people/systems
describes your methodological orientation

worst course in graduate school
"fad" but of no lasting value
has influenced the direction of the field
will become important and influence field
"fad" but of no lasting value
has influenced the direction of the field

useful in research you do
currently popular but not relevant to your work
molar concept which best explains people
central to a course you want to teach
concept to worst course you had in graduate school
molar concept which best explains people
central to best course you had in graduate school
central to worst course you had in graduate school
concept that describes your method logical orientation
"fad" but of no lasting value
used to be highly regarded but not given much credence now
describes your methodological orientation

central to best course in graduate school
molar concept that best explains people
concept that has influenced you personally

useful in your research
currently popular but incompatible with your orien
tation
describes your methodological orientation
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•

used to be highly regarded but not given much
credence now
molar concept that best explains people
molar concept that inadequately explains people
will influence direction of the field
has practical or applied value in creating change
in people/systems
concept that has influenced you personally
central to a course you want to teach
currently popular but incompatible with your orien
tation
currently popular but not relevant to your work

central to best course in graduate school
currently popular but incompatible with your orien
tation
has influenced direction of the field
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SORTS

NO.

SORTS

CONCEPTS

SIMILAR
I.

II.

III.

6,7,9

1,4,15

3,13,14

IV.

4,8,12

V.

7,8,10

VI.

1,6,12

VII.

3,10,11

VIII.

2,4,14

IX.

8,9,14

X.

XI.

2,11,15
1,5,14

XII.

9,11,12

XIII.

7,13,15

XIV.
XV.

3,5,6

2,5,10

CONSTRUCTS

DIFFERENT

EMERGENT

SUBMERGED

